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The severity with which political communities have historically
punished rape indicates, among other things, a powerful, collective
civil social view that rape encompasses brutality deserving of a
people's harshest moral and legal sanction. Blackstone informs us
that, at both Jewish and Saxon law, rape was punishable by death.'
Moreover, English law, though disagreeing at times on the point,
recognized that "rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore
ought severely and impartially to be punished with death."2
Knowing their Blackstone and Hale, and recognizing that the
horrific act of forcing a woman to engage in sex warranted severe
moral disapprobation through criminal and penal law, the early
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University School of Law; B.A., cum laude, Hampden-Sydney College. The author wishes to
thank Georgetown law professor Peter Rubin for his valuable comments throughout the
development of this article. The author also wishes to thank Avelyn M. Ross, Esq., for her
valuable assistance and undying friendship.
1. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND "210-11. Blackstone
explains that rape was defined at common law as "the carnal knowledge of a woman
forcibly and against her will." Id. at *210. At Jewish law, according to Blackstone, rape was
punishable by death where the woman was married to someone other than the rapist. Id. If
she was unmarried, fifty sheckels were to be paid to the victim's father, "and she was to be
the wife of the ravisher all the days of his life." Id. The Saxon capital rape law was
ultimately changed under William the Conqueror, who substituted for the death penalty the
penalty of castration and loss of eyes. Id. at *211. This practice continued until the reign of
Henry HL Id. See also DANIEL BOORSTeN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE: OF THE LAw 115-16, 143 (1941)
(describing Blackstone's explanation of the treatment of rape under English law).
2. 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN "635. Lord Chief Justice Hale
was careful to note, however, that "it must be remembered, that it is an accusation easy to
be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though
innocent." Id. See also 4 BLACKSTONE, supm note 1, at *214-15 (explaining Lord Chief Justice
Hale's views concerning the substantive law of rape and the rules of evidence that should
obtain during a rape prosecution). For an excellent commentary on the way in which Lord
Chief Justice Hale's concerns about false accusations have influenced modern rape law and
jurisprudence, see generally SUSAN EsTricH, REAL RAPE (1987).
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American colonists also made rape a capital crime, a practice that
continued throughout much of American history.3 In doing so,
lawmakers throughout the republic remained faithful to Publius'
assertion that the states would have primary responsibility for the
administration of criminal justice,4 effectuated through a body of
representatives who, cognizant of human nature and recognizing
the complexities of political life, would "refine and enlarge the
public views" regarding crime and punishment.
5
In like manner, the United States Supreme Court was historically
deferential to lawmakers and courts in their imposition of capital
punishment for a variety of crimes and in a variety of ways.
Beginning in the 1970's, however, the Court stepped in its own way,
and that of the political branches. Guided by the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments,"6 and
3. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 42 (1993).
Friedman's magisterial work explains that, while the death penalty was used "sparingly" in
the colonies, rape was among those crimes for which it was invoked. Id. Indeed, at English
law, as Friedman explains, one could be guilty of rape even if no violence occurred, where
the woman raped was under ten years old. Id. For example, in Massachusetts Bay in the
1640's:
three servants of John Humfry had intercourse with his nine-year-old daughter. The
General Court declined to impose the death penalty; there was no specific law on the
subject, and it was not, biblically speaking, a capital crime. They fined the main
villain, ordered his nostrils to be slit and seared, and made him wear a noose of rope
around his neck. The other two culprits were fined and whipped. The General Court
then made rape, including statutory rape, a capital offense.
Id.
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 120 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Hamilton observed that, "there is one transcendent advantage belonging to the province of
State governments - I mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. This, of
all others, is the most powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular
obedience and attachment." Id.
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment provides, "[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
Id. The meaning of the Eighth Amendment has proven to be a source of disagreement
among members of the Supreme Court. Compare, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
967-85 (1991) (describing, in Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court, the history of the Eighth
Amendment and its pedigree), with id. at 1009-12 (White, J., dissenting) (contesting Justice
Scalia's reading of the Eighth Amendment's history). See generally Anthony F Granucci, "Nor
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L REV. 839
(1969) (providing a comprehensive account of the Framers' view of the Eighth Amendment
and concluding that the Framers "misinterpreted English law"); Roaul Berger, The Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT
UNDERSTANDING 303-08 (Eugene W. Hickok Jr. ed., 1991) (providing a detailed historical
review of the Eighth Amendment); THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA. CURRENT CONTROVERSIES
3-24 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997) (providing a brief but illuminating summary of the death
penalty in America and the development of Eighth Amendment doctrine).
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following Chief Justice Warren's earlier admonition that the
constitutionality of criminal punishments should be gauged by the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society,"7 the Court in Furman v. Georgia invalidated
capital sentencing schemes that provided -standardless discretion to
judges and juries in imposing the death penalty.8 The decision
resulted in a wholesale vacation of capital sentences nationally,, and
effectively nullified the capital statutes, including the sixteen for
rape,9 in every state in which the penalty was then imposed. 0
Seeing that the states had revised their practices to conform to
Furman," however, the Court reinstated its approval of the death
penalty four years later in Gregg v. Georgia.2  Among the
post-Furman capital statutes were three (those of Georgia, North
Carolina, and Louisiana) for the rape of an adult woman, and three
more (Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee) for the rape of a child
only.13 The Court did not limit the class of constitutionally eligible
capital defendants to those who kill their victims, but it did remind
lawmakers that their capital regimes should not be disproportionate
to the crimes for which capital punishment is imposed
4
Enter Coker v. Georgia, which held that capital punishment for
7. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). Trop involved the government's deprivation
of the defendant's citizenship after the defendant deserted the Army during World War II. Id.
at 88. The Court, applying the "evolving standards of decency" rationale, found that the
government's penalty violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 101.
8. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman was a per curiam decision in which each of the nine
Justices wrote separately. The controlling opinions are those of Justices Douglas, Stewart,
and White, who argued that the statutes at issue lacked standards sufficient to ensure
against arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty. See id. at 253 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). See also Daniel D. Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment?: Furman v.
Georgia, 1972 SuP. CT. REv. 1 (conducting an analysis of the various opinions in Furman).
9. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977).
10. See Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE LJ. 908, 915 (1982)
(explaining that Furman resulted in vacated sentences for all 629 persons on death row at
the time of Furman).
11. See Jennifer L. Cordle, State v. Wilson: Social Discontent, Retribution, and the
Constitutionality of Capital Punishment for Raping a Child, 27 CAP. U. L Rev. 135, 137
(1998). Cordle explains that states responded to Furman in two ways: "either they provided
for a system of guided discretion, in which the trier of fact relied on aggravating and
mitigating circumstances when deciding on a sentence, or they provided for mandatory
imposition of the death penalty for particular offenses." Id. Of course, the latter of these
alternatives, mandatory capital punishment, was invalidated in Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976).
12. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
13. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 594-95. Once again, two of these statutes, North Carolina's
and Louisiana's, provided mandatory capital punishment for rape and were invalidated in
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303, and Roberts, 428 U.S. at 336.
14. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173, 183.
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the rape of an adult woman was a disproportionate penalty
because, among other reasons, the victim was not killed.15 In the
course of its holding, however, the Coker plurality vastly
underestimated the severe psychological, emotional, and physio-
logical effects of rape on the victim, as well as the violence done to
the victim throughout the rape.' 6 In one decision, then, the Court
not only invalidated capital rape laws, it also cast doubt on the
states' abilities, consistent with long developed penal and
jurisprudential traditions, to impose civil society's most severe legal
and moral sanction for the variety of acts that the body politic had
collectively determined to be most deserving of that sanction.
Herein lies the current controversy. Despite Coker, a number of
states retain, and, indeed, have only recently enacted, the death
penalty for crimes in which the victim is not killed. 17 Perhaps the
15. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597-98 ("The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that,
does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, fife may not be
nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair."). Before
Coker, the Court had refused to hear Eighth Amendment challenges to capital rape statutes
but not without comment from some members of the Court. See, e.g., Rudolph v. Alabama,
375 U.S. 889-91 (1963) (opinion of Goldberg, J., joined by Douglas and Brennan, J.J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (questioning whether the Eighth Amendment permits
capital punishment for the crime of rape). For a critique of Justice Goldberg's dissent, see
Herbert L. Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARv. L REV. 1071, 1072-73
(1964) (suggesting that Justice Goldberg's "questions" about the imposition of capital
punishment for rape "may well be regarded as a sketch for an opinion on the merits").
16. See Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation
and Prevention, 87 CAuF. L REV. 827, 920 (1999). Professor Jones likewise has difficulty with
the Coker Court's assessment, stating that while the Court's claim about the rape-murder
dichotomy "is purportedly objective ... I am not presently convinced that men in the legal
system should be quite so sanguine about their ability to make such assessments of female
psychology in the context of rape." Id. See also Bridgett M. Palmer, Death as a
Proportionate Penalty for the Rape of a Child: Considering One State's Current Law, 15 GA
ST. U. L REV. 843, 863-65 (1999) (explaining that "while life ends for the murder victim, the
rape victim must cope with far more than the initial physical pain of rape. The victim must
also deal with the psychological pain of being raped."). The effects are particularly harmful
in the context of child rape. See id. at 864; Arthur J. Lurgio et al., Child Sexual Abuse: Its
Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Probation Practice, 59 FED. PROBATION 69, 70
(1995) (explaining the severe emotional and psychological effects of rape upon child
victims); cf. ESTmCH, supra note 2, at 82-83 (discussing the "rape as violence" reform view,
which focuses on the violent aspects of rape (including rape as power) and which, for
Professor Estrich, is "the better approach [to rape reform] both theoretically and
strategically"); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Maiming the Soul: Judges, Sentencing, and the Myth of
the Nonviolent Rapist, 20 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 439, 441 (1993) (arguing that the idea of a
"nonviolent" rape is fictional and that "[judges and attorneys must expand their definitions
of violence to include injury to the victim's psyche.").
17. See Michael Higgins, Is Capital Punishment for Killers Only?, 83 A-B.A J. 30
(Aug. 1997). Higgins indicates that 14 jurisdictions, as of 1997, impose the death penalty for
crimes in which the victim need not be killed: California (treason), Colorado (kidnapping
where the victim is harmed, and treason), Florida (drug trafficking), Georgia (aircraft
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most compelling of these regimes is Louisiana's, which by statute
provides capital punishment for the rape of a child under the age
of twelve.'8 Louisiana thus seized upon the limiting "adult woman"
language of Coker 9 and upon Coker's considerably scattered Eighth
Amendment progeny, which suggests that a specific intent to kill
one's victim is not necessary to the imposition of capital
punishment.20 The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the law in State
hijacking, treason, and rape of. a child under 12), Idaho (kidnapping where the victim is
harmed), Illinois (treason, and aggravated kidnapping for ransom), Louisiana (treason, and
rape of a child under 12), Mississippi (treason, and aircraft piracy), Missouri (treason,
kidnapping, dealing drugs near schools, and placing bombs near bus terminals), Montana
(aggravated assault or kidnapping while incarcerated in state prison for murder or persistent
felonies, and treason), New Mexico (espionage), Washington (treason), and the United States
(treason, and drug dealing by a drug kingpin). Id.
Until 1997, Utah imposed capital punishment for aggravated assault by a prisoner serving a
sentence for a first degree felony, when the prisoner intentionally caused serious bodily
injury. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-103.5(2)(b) (1995). The Utah Supreme Court then invalidated
the statute as imposing cruel and unusual punishment in violation of both the Utah and
Federal Constitutions. State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630 (Utah 1997).
The notion of imposing capital punishment upon those who commit inherently serious
crimes, but who did not take a human life, has a distinguished pedigree in law. Plato's
Athenian Stranger (probably Socrates), for example, found it disgraceful but nonetheless
necessary in a regime that legislates for human beings rather than "heroes and sons of gods"
to provide capital punishment for the most severe offenses. PLATo, THE LAws 355-56 (T.J.
Saunders trans., 1970). These offenses included robbery from the temples, subversion, and
treason. Id. at 356-60. The Laws thus modified Plato's utopian vision from The Republic,
which posited that, because the ruling philosopher-kings can contemplate and administer
justice perfectly, there is no need for extensive legislation. See generally PLATO, THE REPUBuc
(G.M.A. Grube trans., 1992). In addition, Blackstone explained that the law had traditionally
punished with death the sexual "crimes against nature," although the crimes themselves did
not involve the taking of a life. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *216.
18. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §14:42(c) (West 1996). Mississippi and Georgia have also
moved to impose the death penalty upon child rapists. MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (Supp.
1997); see also Higgins, supra note 17, at 30 (listing the jurisdictions, including Georgia, that
impose the death penalty for the rape of a child).
19. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592, 593, 595-97, 601.
20. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (holding that capital punishment is
not excessive where the defendant, who is a major participant in the crime, demonstrates a
reckless indifference to human life). See also infra Section II.B text and accompanying notes
(providing an analysis of Tison and other recent Eighth Amendment cases bearing upon the
question of whether capital punishment can be imposed for the rape of a child).
A number of commentators have commented upon the Court's ambiguous, and confusing
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth
Amendment Regulation of the Capital Sentencing ThiWl, 146 U. PA. L REv. 795, 797 (1998)
(arguing that the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has ignored and complicated the
purpose of the Eighth Amendment, which "speaks to the question of who can receive the
death penalty and does so in terms that should guide the capital sentencer"); Carol S. Steiker
& Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional
Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARv. L REV. 355, 359 (1995) (evaluating the Court's
Eighth Amendment cases and describing them as "a body of law at once so messy and so
meaningless"); Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46
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v. Wilson,21 and the Supreme Court has, for the moment, refused to
review it.22 Nevertheless, the Louisiana law presents the question of
whether, in a constitutional scheme in which criminal punishments
must be "proportionate" to the crime committed, the imposition of
capital punishment for the rape of a child is constitutionally
permissible.2 3 Undoubtedly, the answer to that question, given the
CASE W. RES. L REV. 1, 29 (1995) (complaining that the Court's continued use of its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence "will continue to give opponents a legitimate platform from which
to impede even the most determined efforts to carry out the death penalty on a routine
basis"); Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85
MICH. L REV. 1741, 1819 (1987) (stating that "[t]he Justices have provided this lesson, though
unwittingly, by embodying their conceptions of American society: In conflicts among
implacably opposed adversaries, nothing is ever sensibly resolved or learned."); see also
Packer, supra note 15, at 1081-82 (predicting the difficulties that would be raised were the
Court to engage in regulation of capital sentencing legislation).
21. 685 So.2d 1063 (La. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S.
1259 (1997).
22. Id.
23. The literature on this issue and the constitutionality of this particular statute is
most thoughtful. Although the authors divide on their approaches to determining whether the
statute violates Coker and the Eighth Amendment, most all of these authors have urged that
the existing statute is unconstitutional. Compare, e.g., Annaliese Flynn Fleming, Louisiana's
Newest Capital Crime: The Death Penalty for Child Rape, 89 J. CRam. L & CRIMINOLOGY 717,
749 (1999) (contending that "[tihe crime of raping a child is clearly heinous and deserving of
severe punishment; however, because the crime does not result in the loss of human life, the
Court will likely follow the line drawn in Coker and prohibit imposing the death penalty for
this crime."); and Pallie Zambrano, The Death Penalty is Cruel and Unusual Punishment
for the Crime of Rape - Even the Rape of a Child, 39 SANTA CLARA L REV. 1267, 1269 (1999)
(concluding that "the sentence of death is too severe a punishment for the crime of rape or
any crime that does not include intent to kill"); and Pamela J. Lormand, Proportionate
Sentencing for Rape of a Minor: The Death Penalty Dilemma, 73 Tu L. REv. 981, 1015
(1999) (arguing that capital child rape statutes impose an excessive punishment); and J.
Chandler Bailey, Death Is Different, Even on the Bayou: The Disproportionality of Crime
and Punishment in Louisiana's Capital Child Rape Statute, 55 WASH. & LEE L REV. 1335,
1336-37 (1998) (arguing same); and Emily Marie Moeller, Devolving Standards of Decency:
Using the Death Penalty to Punish Child Rapists, 102 DICK L REV. 621, 648 (1998) (arguing
same); with Palmer, supra note 16, at 846-47 (arguing that the statute is constitutional but
that the Court is likely to invalidate it under Coker); and Elizabeth Gray, Death Penalty and
Child Rape: An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 42 ST. Louis LJ. 1443, 1469 (1998) (arguing
that Louisiana must adopt greater procedural safeguards to constitutionally maintain the
statute); and Yale Glazer, Child Rapists Beware! The Death Penalty and Louisiana's
Aggravated Rape Statute, 25 Am. J. CRIM. L 79, 112-13 (1997) (arguing that Louisiana's law
could survive constitutional scrutiny if amended to provide for appropriate aggravating
factors); see also Michael Mello, Executing Rapists: A Reluctant Essay on the Ethics of
Legal Scholarship, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L 129, 170-71 (1997) (concluding that Coker
was rightly decided but that racism counsels against capital punishment for rapists); Angelyn
Miller, Can a Convicted Rapist Be Sentenced to Death for Raping A Child Under Twelve
Years of Age?, 37 WASHBURN LJ. 187, 201-02 (1997) (concluding that although the Supreme
Court is likely to invalidate the statute, capital punishment might be appropriate if the rapist
transmitted MIV to the victim).
While this article relies upon the helpful work of these authors, as noted above, it differs
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prevalence today of capital punishment legislation for a variety of
non-homicide crimes, will weigh heavily on the related question of
whether it is ever permissible for the state to impose capital
punishment for crimes where no death has occurred.
24
This article examines that most difficult issue, which squarely
challenges the Coker rape rationale. Section II analyzes the Court's
decision in Coker and several important cruel and unusual
punishment decisions that followed, many of which invoke, and
attempt to refine, the Coker analysis. Section III examines
Louisiana's capital child rape statute, the Louisiana Supreme Court's
Wilson decision, and the practices of other states in providing
capital punishment for non-homicide crimes. Section IV then argues
that, despite questions inherent in the Court's inconsistent capital
punishment jurisprudence, the Eighth Amendment permits capital
child rape legislation. This conclusion is based on three premises:
trends in recent precedent that urge greater deference to the
political branches in criminal legislation; history and practice,
viewed through a more expansive field of vision that includes
consideration of legislation concerning other sex offenses and
non-homicide capital crimes; and the brutality of rape itself, which
undermines the Coker Court's proportionality analysis. This analysis
therefore gives greater, though not unlimited, constitutional latitude
to states in addressing inherently serious non-homicide crimes,
especially the physically and psychologically devastating, and
increasingly problematic, crime of rape, particularly as applied ,to
the rape of a child. Finally, this article offers a cautionary note to
lawmakers and others involved in criminal justice and rape
sentencing reform, urging that they carefully consider the problem
of racial discrimination when adopting and administering the new
capital regimes, particularly those that include rape.
from the existing literature by suggesting that the confluence of precedent, "living tradition,"
and the effects of rape on the victim help to determine whether capital child rape statutes
are valid pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, as the Court has understood it. As applied to
the instant issue, this approach thus considers not only the history of capital rape laws but
also their continued vitality in light of modem legislative practices and the modem
psychology of rape, concluding that states should be permitted to execute child rapists in
certain circumstances. See infra Section IV text and accompanying notes.
24. See Jeffrey C. Matura, When Will it Stop?: The Use of the Death Penalty for
Non-Homicide Crimes, 24 J. LEGIs. 249, 262 (1998) (detailing the problem of imposing capital




II. COKER v. GEORGIA AND THE TRAIL IT HAS BLAZED
To better understand the constitutional dynanics inherent in
recent legislative efforts to expand the imposition of capital
punishment, it is important to view the decisions that have been
the impetus for those efforts. This Section, therefore, will analyze
the seminal decision in Coker, as well as the Court's several
subsequent decisions attempting to refine the proportionality
analysis explicated (for want of a better description) in Coker.
What emerges from these decisions is a confusing and ambiguous
doctrinal understanding of the Eighth Amendment. It is precisely
this ambiguity and confusion upon which legislators, most
particularly (for purposes of this paper) those in Louisiana, have
seized in extending capital punishment to a range of non-homicide
crimes.
A. Coker v. Georgia
On the evening of September 2, 1974, having been convicted in
1973 of murder, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated assault, Ehrlich
Anthony Coker was serving three life sentences, two twenty-year
sentences, and one eight-year sentence in the Ware Correctional
Institute, located just outside Waycross, Georgia. 25 His year-
and-a-half stay at Ware for those offenses, however, ended that
evening as Coker escaped and made his way to the home of Allen
and Elnita Carver.26 After binding Mr. Carver's limbs and placing
him in the family's bathroom, Coker obtained control of a kitchen
knife, keys to the family car, and Mrs. Carver, whom, upon
brandishing the knife, he raped.2 7 Coker then drove away in the car
with Mrs. Carver.28 Mr. Carver untied himself and notified the
police, who subsequently apprehended Coker and saved Mrs.
Carver.29 A Georgia jury subsequently convicted Coker of escape,
armed robbery, motor vehicle theft, kidnapping, and rape.30
Pursuant to the commands of Georgia's post-Furman capital




29. Id. The plurality opinion, in describing this portion of the facts, wrote that "Mrs.
Carver was unharmed." Id. As stated above, "saved" seems a better description, given the
harrowing experience through which Mrs. Carver had been put physically, emotionally, and
psychologically.
30. Coker, 433 U.S. at 587.
Vol. 39:1
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sentencing scheme, 31 the jury sentenced Coker to death by
electrocution for raping Mrs. Carver.32 The Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed both the conviction and sentence. 33
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed, limiting
its analysis to the issue of whether the imposition of capital
punishment for rape constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.34 Conceding that "it
is now settled" that the death penalty does not per se violate the
Eighth Amendment, 35 Justice White's opinion for the plurality
nonetheless cautioned that, under Gregg, the Eighth Amendment
proscribes punishments that are " 'excessive' in relation to the
crime committed."36 This, the plurality noted, occurs when the
punishment "(1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable
goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of suffering; or (2) is grossly
out of proportion to the severity of the crime."37 To confirm such a
determination, courts should consider objective factors such as
history, precedent, legislative practices, and the decisions of
juries.38 These factors satisfactorily confirm the conclusion that
capital punishment for deliberate murder is not a disproportionate
penalty.39 Where the rape of an adult woman is concerned,
however, the analysis changes somewhat.
Claiming the guidance of history and "objective evidence of the
31. See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3102 (Supp. 1976) (providing for capital jury sentencing
based on the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance and a recommendation of
the death penalty).
32. Coker, 433 U.S. at 591.
33. See Coker v. State, 216 S.E.2d 782 (Ga 1975).
34. Coker, 433 U.S. at 586. The Court did not address in any way the problem of racial
discrimination in the imposition of capital punishment for rape. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE,
CRIME, AND THE LAw 324 (1997) (explaining that the Court had an excuse for failing to
mention race, as both the defendant and the victim were white); cf. Brief for Amici Curiae of
the American Civil Liberties Union, The Center for Constitutional Rights, The National
Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education Fund, The Women's Law Project, The
Center for Women Policy Studies, The Women's Legal Defense Fund, and Equal Rights
Advocates, Inc., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 75-5444) (stating, in a brief
written by now-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, that the death penalty for rape "is an
outgrowth of both male patriarchal views of women no longer seriously maintained by
society and gross racial injustice created in part out of that patriarchal foundation"). As
Professor Mello explains, "[tihe Court ignored amici's arguments." Melo, supra note 23, at
162.
35. Coker, 433 U.S. at 591.






country's present judgment concerning the acceptability of death as
a penalty for the rape of an adult woman," the plurality noted that
by the time of Furman, only sixteen states and the Federal
Government authorized capital punishment for raping an adult
woman.40 After Furman, only three states revised their capital
sentencing statutes and included rape of an adult woman among
the capital offenses.41 This objective evidence, then, combined with
the consistent refusal of Georgia juries to impose capital
punishment for rape, weighed heavily in favor of a national
judgment rejecting death as a punishment for the rape of an adult
woman.42 This evidence, though, was merely a factor for the
plurality, merely a series of elements confirming the Court's "own
judgment" that death is a disproportionate penalty for the rape of
an adult woman.4 That "judgment" led. the plurality to assert,
rather remarkably, that, while rape is a serious crime,
in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person
and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which
does involve the unjustified taking of human life .... rape by
definition does not include the death of or even the serious
injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no
more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the
murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy
as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond
repair. 4
Thus, for the plurality, the absence of loss of life was crucial in its
40. Coker, 433 U.S. at 593 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 594. Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee also adopted capital rape statutes
after Furman, but those statutes punished only the rape of a child by an adult. See FI. STAT.
ANN. § 794.011(2) (1976); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3702
(1974). The Tennessee Supreme Court invalidated the state's capital child rape statute in
1977 because it provided a mandatory death sentence in contravention of Woodson. Collins v.
State, 550 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1977).
42. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596-97.
43. Id. at 597. The plurality wrote:
These recent events evidencing the attitude of state legislatures and sentencing juries
do not wholly determine this controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in
the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability
of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment. Nevertheless, the legislative
rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly confirms our own judgment, which is
that death is indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult
woman.
Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 598. But see, e.g., Jones, supra note 16, at 920 (questioning the all-male
Court's ability to adequately assess "female psychology in the context of rape").
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independent proportionality assessment of Georgia's capital rape
statute.
Justice Powell offered an important separate concurrence,
agreeing that, on the available facts, Georgia's capital rape statute
imposed a punishment disproportionate to the crime committed
(the rape of an adult woman). 45 Justice Powell determined that
"there is no indication that [Coker's] offense was committed with
excessive brutality or that the victim sustained serious or lasting
injury." 16 The plurality opinion, however, was unnecessarily broad
because it purported to offer a per se rule on the disproportionality
of capital punishment for rape, according to Justice Powell.
47
Therefore, Justice Powell dissented with regard to the plurality's
bright line test, explaining persuasively that in some circumstances
"[t]he deliberate viciousness of the rapist may be greater than that
of the murderer. . . . [slome victims are so grievously injured
physically or psychologically that life is beyond repair."48 Despite
the plurality's scrutiny of the "objective" factors, "it has not been
shown that society finds the death penalty disproportionate for all
rapes."4
9
The psychological effect of rape on the victim was a particularly
prominent component of Chief Justice Burger's dissent, which
Justice Rehnquist joined. In that dissent, two primary themes
emerge: judicial deference to legislative determinations and the
psychology of rape. After beginning with a familiar caution in death
penalty jurisprudence - that the Court's task "is not to give effect
to our individual views on capital punishment" - the Chief
Justice's dissent accused the plurality of doing just that:
"engraft[ing] their conceptions of proper public policy onto the
45. Coker, 433 U.S. at 601 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). Note also that Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred, adhering to their
respective views that the death penalty is always cruel and unusual punishment. See id. at
600 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment; Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
46. Id. at 601 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
One wonders whether Justice Powell realized the consequences of this particular statement,
especially in light of his thoughtful arguments later in the opinion concerning the severe
psychological harms that rape produces. After all, Coker threatened Mrs. Carver (age 16 at
the time) with a kitchen knife, raped her in the presence of her husband, and kidnapped her.
She lived, to be sure, but to say that she was not treated with "excessive brutality" or that
she did not sustain "serious or lasting injury" woefully disregards the nature and psychology
of rape, of which Justice Powel proved subsequently that he was well aware.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 603 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).




considered legislative judgments of the States."50 The plurality
opinion, the Chief Justice complained, was too broad, going beyond
the particular facts and circumstances of Mrs. Carver's rape.51 The
plurality opinion, along with Justice Powell's concurring statement,
ignored rape as an "inherently . . . egregiously brutal" crime and
one that Coker was especially prone to committing. 2 As for the
plurality's use of the objective statistical data, the Chief Justice
explained that Furman introduced "[c]onsiderable uncertainty . .-.
into this area of the law"; the failure of more states to impose
death for the rape of an adult woman could easily be explained by
political compromises, time pressures, or "a desire to wait on the
experience of those States which did enact such statutes."14 The
plurality, according to the Chief Justice, was thus misguided in its
use of post-Furman statistics as evidence of a national judgment
on this issue.
In addition, the plurality ignored the substantial evidence
available concerning the psychology of rape. On this point, the
Chief Justice made eloquent use of the disturbing realities of rape:
A rapist not only violates a victim's privacy and personal
integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as
physical harm in the process. The long-range effect upon the
victim's life and health is likely to be irreparable; it is
impossible to measure the harm which results .... Rape is
not a mere physical attack - it is destructive of the human
personality. The remainder of the victim's life may be gravely
affected, and this in turn may have a serious detrimental effect
upon her husband and any children she may have ....
Victims may recover from the physical damage of knife or
bullet wounds, or a beating with fists or a club, but recovery
from such a gross assault on the human personality is not
healed by medicine or surgery.5
In light of these realities, the Chief Justice determined that the
plurality's conclusion that death is an excessive punishment for
rape is "inexplicable."
56
50. Coker, 433 U.S. at 6)4 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 606 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 607-08 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Coker, 433 U.S. at 611-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 612 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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The confusion that Coker has helped to precipitate is thus
evident in the plurality opinion itself, which appears to rest on a
number of questionable premises. 57 First, the plurality claims that
rape is a reprehensible crime,58 but fails to explain any of the
available evidence concerning the profound and disturbing physical
and psychological impact of rape on its victim. Only Justice Powell,
the Chief Justice, and Justice Rehnquist demonstrated a persuasive
recognition of these harsh realities.59 Rather, the Court simply
proceeds from the assumed premise that rape cannot compare
sufficiently with murder as a capital offense because it involves no
loss of life. Second, the Court claims to issue a judgment as to the
disproportionality of capital punishment for rape generally, but
then makes repeated references to the rape of an adult woman,6° a
linguistic peculiarity also found in Justice Powell's separate
opinion.61 Finally, the plurality explains that history, precedent,
legislation, and jury determinations guide the proportionality
analysis. Its use of those factors, however, as the Chief Justice
explained, is open to considerable question, for it gave scant
attention to the long history of capital rape proscriptions both in
English law and in American law and to the very real ambiguities
inherent in the post-Furman and Gregg legislative worlds.62 The
extent and constitutional contours of legislative power to punish
serious crimes that do not cause or result in death to the victim
thus were subject to even greater question after Coker, and
demanded greater explanation and clarity.
B. Proportionality and the Eighth Amendment, Post-Coker
Such an explanation and clarity, however, were not to come.
This is sufficiently apparent in a string of varied non-capital
57. See David J. Karp, Coker v. Georgia: Disproportionate Punishment and the Death
Penalty for Rape, 78 CoLU L REv. 1714 (1978). Karp's article possesses much foresight,
concluding that Coker's premises are untenable and predicts that, as to the loss of life
requirement, "it is not certain that the Court will adhere to this principle in later cases." Id.
at 1727.
58. Coker, 433 U.S. at 599 ("Short of homicide, rape is the 'ultimate violation of
self.' ").
59. Id. at 603 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 611-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 592, 593, 596, 597.
61. See id. at 601 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (joining the plurality's reasoning on the facts here that "ordinarily death is
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult woman.").
62. See id. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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proportionality cases, in which the Court vacillated on the use of
proportionality analysis where the death penalty is not imposed.63
With reference to Coker, the Court consistently made clear that
proportionality analysis is required in capital cases because, as the
Court has recognized, "death is different."64 Nonetheless, that
analysis has proven equally vacillating in the capital arena.
In Enmund v. Florida,6 5 the Court reversed the death sentence
63. See Rmunell v. Estelie, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982);
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)
(holding unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment defendant's sentence of 15 years in
prison and "cadena temporal" punishment, which included hard labor in chains and
attendant civil restrictions, for falsifying a public document).
In Rummell, the Court upheld a sentence of life in prison .imposed upon a defendant
pursuant to a Texas recidivist statute. Rummell, 445 U.S. at 266. The defendant's crimes were
fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 in goods and services, passing a forged check
for $28.36, and obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. Id. at 265-66. Rejecting the Eighth
Amendment proportionality challenge, the Court refused to apply the Coker rationale to a
case that did not involve the death penalty, instead deferring to legislative judgment
concerning the appropriate penalty for repeat offenders. Id. at 274.
In Davis, the Court (per curiam) upheld the defendant's forty-year prison sentence and
$20,000 fine for possession and distribution of less than nine ounces of marijuana. Davis, 454
U.S. at 371. The Court, as in Rummell, refused to employ a bright line proportionality test in
non-capital cases, and chastised the lower courts for courting anarchy by "ignor[ing] the
hierarchy of the federal court system." Id. at 374-75.
In Solem, however, the Court held that a life sentence imposed under a South Dakota
recidivist statute upon a defendant who uttered a no account check for $100 was
disproportionate and thus violated the Eighth Amendment. Solem, 463 U.S. at 281. The
defendant's previous offenses included three convictions for burglary, one for false
pretenses, one for grand larceny, and one for a third offense of driving while intoxicated. Id.
at 279-81. The Court argued that the Eighth Amendment, consistent with English and
common law practice, required proportionality in sentencing. Id. at 284. The Court also
applied the three-part test for proportionality that it had rejected in Rummell and Davis and
that included consideration of the gravity of the offense compared to the punishment's
severity, other penalties that the jurisdiction imposes for similar offenses, and penalties
imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense. Id. at 290-91.
Importantly, Justice Scalia, for himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued in Harmelin v.
Michigan that Solem read wrongly the history of the common law and of the Eighth
Amendment, which did not require proportionality in non-capital cases, and, thus, that Solem
should be overruled. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 974-985 (1991) (per Scalia, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J.); see also Berger, supra note 6, at 305 (stating that Solem's
"proportionality statement is ahistorical. The Framers were far from adopting a principle of
proportionality.").
For an excellent treatment of proportionality in these and related cases, see Steven
Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court's Tortured
Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 Ky. UJ. 107 (1995-96).
64. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994 ("Proportionality review is one of several respects
in which we have held that 'death is different,' and have imposed protections that the
Constitution nowhere else provides."); Rummell, 445 U.S. at 272 ("This theme, the unique
nature of the death penalty for purposes of Eighth Amendment analysis, has been repeated
time and again in our opinions") (citing Furman, Gregg, and Woodson) (emphasis added).
65. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
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of defendant Earl Enmund, who was convicted of first-degree
felony murder after accompanying two co-defendants to a
farmhouse where the co-defendants robbed and killed an elderly
couple.6 Enmund, however, merely served as passenger, and later
driver, of the car in which the perpetrators arrived and fled.67 In
another opinion by Justice White, the Court again looked to
objective evidence.68 It found that only eight states imposed capital
punishment upon a defendant who "somehow participated in a
robbery in the course of which a murder was committed."69 It also
found that juries have consistently rejected imposition of death for
defendants like Enmund.70 Again, however, the Court used the
objective factors merely as elements that would either confirm or
contradict the independent judgment of the Justices. 7' And again,
the Court concluded that unless the defendant's criminal act
demonstrates an actual taking, attempt to take, or intent to take a
human life, a state cannot impose capital punishment for that
crime.7 2 Enmund thus appeared to clarify the circumstances under
which legislators could act in crafting capital punishment schemes,.
limiting imposition of the death penalty to circumstances where
death to the victim is a product or object of a defendant's
intentions, expectations, or concomitant actions.
Five years after Enmund, however, the Court again muddied the
capital punishment waters. Tison v. Arizona73 involved three
brothers who, along with their mother, uncle, and other relatives,
planned the escape of their father, Gary, from an Arizona prison.74
Without firing shots, the three Tison brothers effectuated the
escape, which also included their father's cellmate, Randy
Greenawalt. 75 The five fled the prison grounds, and after losing two
66. Id. at 784-85.
67. Id. at 784.
68. Id. at 788-89.
69. Id. at 792.
70. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 795.
71. Id. at 797. Justice White wrote, as he did in Coker, that:
Although the judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the
balance, it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits
imposition of the death penalty on one such as Enmund who aids and abets a felony
in the course of which a murder is conmitted by others but who does not himself




73. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).




tires on their Lincoln automobile, decided to steal the car of an
oncoming motorist.76 The motorist, John Lyons, along with his wife,
two-year-old son, and fifteen-year-old niece, stopped, expecting to
render aid to the five.77 The group, however, forced the Lyons
family into the disabled Lincoln, where they were taken into the
desert.78 Later, after the Tison brothers were ordered to go to the
Lyons' car for water, Gary Tison forced the Lyons family to stand
in front of the Lincoln, where he shot the four captives. 79 The five
perpetrators were later apprehended; one of the Tison brothers was
killed, the other two were tried and convicted of capital murder,
armed robbery, kidnapping, and automobile theft.80 They challenged
their death sentence pursuant to the Enmund proportionality
rationale.
81
The Court, however, proved unimpressed by the challenge.
Justice O'Connor, a dissenter in Enmund, 2 wrote for the Court
that Enmund was limited to the particular circumstances of that
case, where the defendant's participation in the murder was
relatively attenuated. 83 Here, however, although the Tison brothers
did not kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill as Enmund described
those categories of culpability, they were, nevertheless, major
participants in the crimes that resulted in death s4 Moreover, their
participation, and failure to render aid once they became aware of
the shooting, could have indicated a reckless indifference to human
life.ss Under these circumstances - where a criminal actor is a
major participant in a felony and shows reckless indifference to
human life - capital punishment is not a disproportionate penalty
for the crime.86 Having accepted the Arizona courts' determinations
that the Tisons were major participants, the Court vacated the
judgments and remanded for consideration the question of whether
the brothers were recklessly indifferent.87
76. Id. at 140.
77. Id.
78. T/son, 481 U.S. at 140.
79. Id. at 141.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 143.
82. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801-02 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with the Court's holding because it "interferes with state criteria for assessing
legal guilt by recasting intent as a matter of federal constitutional law").
83. Tison, 458 U.S. at 149.
84. Id. at 151.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 158.
87. Id.
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Tison thus provides greater latitude for legislatures in imposing
capital punishment that meets the Court's proportionality standards,
difficult though they are to discern. While Coker and Enmund
placed in jeopardy any scheme that imposed capital punishment for
a crime wherein the defendant did not kill, attempt to kill, or
intend to kill, Tison left the door slightly ajar by expanding the
Enmund culpability rule. 8 Pursuant to Tison, it appears that a
state may still punish a broad range of criminal acts with death
where those acts involve major participation and reckless
indifference.
After Tison, the Court issued several important Eighth
Amendment decisions, four in particular. Although these cases
involved defendants who actually killed their victims, they are
relevant to our inquiry here - the constitutionality of imposing
capital punishment for child rape - not only because they touch
upon proportionality but because they provide still further evidence
of the Court's confused and confusing approach to Eighth
Amendment questions generally. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 9 for
example, a plurality of the Court reversed the death sentence of a
defendant who had committed murder at age fifteen.90 In now
familiar fashion, Justice Stevens's plurality opinion canvassed the
various state legislative and jury sentencing trends, and found that
the statistical data once again weighed against imposing capital
punishment for a defendant who perpetrated a crime under age
sixteen.91 Once again, however, the plurality ultimately relied upon
its own judgment in determining that young teenagers lack
sufficient experience and intelligence to fully appreciate the
consequences of their conduct, and thus lack the level of
culpability common to adult criminals. 92 Therefore, the plurality
concluded that imposing capital punishment upon one who
commits a crime at age fifteen would not serve the goals of
retribution or deterrence and is prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment.9 3 Interestingly, Justice O'Connor provided the crucial
vote, arguing that Oklahoma's failure to provide a minimum age for
execution in its statute created the likelihood that the state
88. Cf. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 20, at 376 (stating that "the Court subsequently
retracted [the Enmund] standard" in T/son).
89. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
90. Id. at 819.
91. Id. at 823-25.
92. Id. at 835.
93. Id. at 838.
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legislature did not intend to impose capital punishment for
defendants as young as Thompson.94In Stanford v. Kentucky and Missouri v. Wilkins,95 however, the
Court affirmed the death sentences of defendants who committed
brutal murders at ages seventeen and sixteen, respectively.9 6 Writing
for the Court and -giving greater weight than the Court had
previously given to common law practice, Justice Scalia argued that
the objective factors, most notably traditional legislative practices
that were still continuing in the United States, clearly indicated that
society had not "set its face against" the imposition of the death
penalty for sixteen or seventeen-year-olds. 97 The burden of proving
a national consensus against such a practice, Justice Scalia argued,
fell on the defendants, who were unable to show such a
consensus.98 More notably, Justice Scalia argued that the Court
should not engage in independent judgment on the issue of
proportionality.99 The Court's consideration of the objective indicia
of a societal consensus regarding particular applications of the
death penalty itself determines whether that application is
disproportionate. 100 Efforts to construct a proportionality analysis
based on distinct methodologies are, therefore, misguided,
ultimately giving effect to the individual political and philosophical
preferences of the Justices rather than the traditions and
conscience of the body politic, as expressed through the republican
processes. 101
Finally, in the same term, the Court held in Penry v. Lynaugh
that the Eighth Amendment does not categorically prohibit the
94. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
95. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The Court consolidated these cases upon granting certiorari.
96. Id. at 365-66.
97. Id. at 370-73.
98. Id. at 373.
99. Id. at 378 ("[W]e emphatically reject petitioner's suggestion that the issues in this
case permit us to apply our 'own informed judgment' regarding the desirability of permitting
the death penalty for crimes by 16- and 17-year-olds.") (citation omitted).
100. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
101. Id. at 379. Justice Scalia concluded that:
To say . . . that 'it is for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment
permits imposition of the death penalty' - and to mean it as the dissent means it, i.e.,
that it is for us to judge, not on the basis of what we perceive the Eighth Amendment
originally prohibited, or on the basis of what we perceive society through its
democractic processes now overwhelmingly disapproves, but on the basis of what we
think 'proportionate' and 'measurably contributory to acceptable goals of punishment'
- to say and mean that, is to replace judges of the law with a committee of
philosopher-kings.
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state from imposing the death penalty on a defendant who is
mentally retarded.10 2 There, the defendant, who had been tested
continually as possessing an IQ between fifty and sixty-three, was
accused of raping, beating, and stabbing a woman in her Texas
home.'13 A Texas jury found defendant competent to stand trial and
convicted him of capital murder °4 The Court upheld his death
sentence on this ground.0 5 Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court
found that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit Penry's
execution because (1) the jury found him competent to stand trial
and rejected his insanity defense, 6 and (2) consistent with the
legislative practices in nearly every state, the record did not
indicate that Penry lacked the "cognitive, volitional, and moral
capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the
death penalty."'01 7  Thus, Penry's punishment was not
disproportionate within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. 0
8
What emerges from these later cases,' °9 then, is a Court
struggling to find a coherent methodological approach to Eighth
Amendment proportionality problems. It is relatively clear that the
Court has become comfortable with an analysis that considers
legislative practice and (to some extent) history and tradition, what
Professor Michael Mello has described as legislative "bean
counting,"1'0 as well as the other objective indicia of societal
consensus. The weight accorded the indicia, however, has clearly
varied from case to case, from serving merely as helpful factors in
guiding the Court's independent judgment in Coker"' and
Enmund,"2 to serving as dispositive factors in Stanford.113 This
102. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
103. Id. at 307.
104. Id. at 308-11.
105. Id. at 340. Note that the Court did, however, reverse and remand on other
grounds, namely that the jury had to be given instructions that it could consider mitigating
evidence of Penry's retardation and background of abuse. Id. at 328.
106. Id. at 333.
107. Penry, 492 U.S. at 338.
108. Id. at 340.
109. See also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment does not require federal habeas corpus relief for a death row inmate who claims
actual innocence based on newly-discovered evidence).
110. See Mello, supra note 23, at 153 (explaining that under the Stanford and Tison
explanations, which used essentially the same proportionality analysis, "[b]ean counting
reigned supreme").
111. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) ("[11n the end our own judgment
will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment.").
112. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) ("[Ilt is ultimately for us to judge
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trend, combined with the developments in Tison, then, suggests
that the current Court may well be more receptive than the Burger
Court to legislative efforts to impose capital punishment for child
rape, as well as other serious crimes that do not cause death.
III. LOUISIANA'S CAPITAL CHILD RAPE STATUTE AND STATE V. WILSON:
BLAZING A NEW (AND AN OLD) TRAm
As Coker indicated, as of 1977 two states, Mississippi and Florida,
provided the death penalty for the rape of a child.1 4 Asserting that
the Coker holding was confined to the rape of an adult woman, the
Mississippi Supreme Court upheld that state's capital child rape law
in Upshaw v. State,"5 which was decided immediately after Coker
in 1977. The court cited Chief Justice Burger's explanation of the
strong deterrent effect of such laws, and concluded that the duty of
prescribing appropriate penalties for crime rested ultimately in the
legislative branch."6 Four years later, however, in Buford v. State,"
7
the Florida Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion in
reviewing that state's capital child sexual battery law. Concluding
that Coker extended to those offenses that did not involve the
taking of a life, the court found the death penalty "grossly
disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of sexual
assault."" 8 The confusion over Coker had thus made its way visibly
into the state courts.
In 1995, taking advantage of ambiguous precedent and a growing
national concern regarding punishment for those who commit
offenses (particularly sexual ones) against children,"9 the Louisiana
whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty on one such as
Enmund.").
113. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380 (" '[Pjroportionality' analysis itself can only be
conducted on the basis of the standard set by our own society; the only alternative, once
again, would be .our personal preferences.").
114. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 595.
115. 350 So.2d 1358 (Miss. 1977).
116. Id. at 1360-61. The Mississippi capital child rape statute was ultimately invalidated
in 1989, but not on proportionality grounds. See Leatherwood v. State, 548 So.2d 389, 402-03
(Miss. 1989). In Leatherwood, the court found that life imprisonment was the maximum
penalty that the state could impose for the rape of a child because state law required a
finding that the defendant killed, attempted to kill, intended to kill, or contemplated the use
of lethal force before the state could impose capital punishment. Id.
117. 403 So.2d 943 (Fla. 1981).
118. Id. at 951.
119. See John Q. Barrett, Death Penalty for Child Rapists May Not Save Children, NAT.
LJ., Aug. 18, 1997, at A21 (describing a recent poll indicating that 65 percent of the public
favors imposing the death penalty for child molesters); Mello, supra note 23, at 139
("America's feeling toward child rapists is neither subtle nor difficult to ascertain: we hate
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State Legislature enacted a capital child rape statute, the nation's
only one at the time. 120 While the legislation proved innovative on
its face, it actually returned to the treatment of rape that existed
prior to the mid-twentieth century, one deeply rooted in common
law tradition and practice.' 21 The statute provides that "[w]hoever
commits the crime of aggravated rape ... if the victim was under
the age of twelve years... the offender shall be punished by death
or life imprisonment at hard labor."1 22 If the prosecution seeks a
capital verdict, Louisiana's statutes governing capital punishment
are then invoked. 23 Originally introduced by state Representative
Pete Schneider as House Bill 55, the statute passed the Louisiana
House of Representatives by a vote of seventy-nine to
twenty-two. 24 It then passed the Louisiana Senate - without
debate - thirty-four to one.' 25 Governor Edwards signed the bill
into law on June 17, 1995, and it became effective that August.
26
The first constitutional challenge to the Louisiana statute arose
only m'onths after the law became effective. In December 1995, the
state charged Anthony Wilson with the aggravated rape of a
five-year-old girl.' 27 The next year, the state charged Patrick
Dewayne Bethley with the aggravated rape of three girls, ages five,
seven, and nine.128 One of the victims that the state accused
Bethley of raping was his daughter.1' Moreover, the state alleged
that Bethley committed the rapes with the knowledge that he was
HIV positive.130 Both defendants moved to quash their indictments,
them.").
120. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-42(C)(1) (West 1998 Supp.).
121. See supra Section I text and accompanying notes.
122. § 14-42(c)(1).
123. § 14-42(C)(1)(a).
124. Joanna Weiss & Ed Anderson, Rape Death Penalty Heads to House Floor, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, April 20, 1995, at A3. Representative Schneider argued that "the
facts show that [child rapists] are incurable. They are predators." Marsha Schuler, House
Passes Death Penalty for Child Rape, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, April 27, 1995, at 1B;S.
The House ultimately rejected an amendment to the bill that would have required the
castration of the convicted rapists while they awaited execution. Moeller, supra note 23, at
637. The House also rejected an amendment that would have required a life sentence with
castration for child rapists, instead of the death penalty. Id.
125. See Schuler, supra note 124, at 1B;S.
126. See State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1067 n.5 (La. 1996), cert. denied sub nom.
Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997).
127. Id. at 1064.





and, in both instances, the trial court granted the motions.131 The
state filed appeals to the Louisiana Supreme Court which
consolidated the cases.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Wilson reversed the
decisions of, both trial courts.132 In response to the defendants'
reliance upon the Coker proportionality analysis, the court, in an
opinion by Justice Bleich, first noted that Coker's repeated explicit
language limited the holding there only to the rape of an adult
woman. "3 Next, the court explained that it owed deference to the
judgment of the legislature, "the representatives of society," which
had determined that contemporary standards of decency permitted
the execution of those who commit rape where the victim is under
the age of twelve.M Although Louisiana was the only state at the
time that authorized capital punishment for the rape of a child, the
court explained that:
[t]here is no constitutional infirmity in a state's statute simply
because that jurisdiction chose to be first .... The needs and
standards of society change, and these changes are a result of
experience and knowledge. If no state could pass a law
without other states passing the same or similar law, new laws
could never be passed.'
35
The court thus turned Coker's analysis of the legislative indicia on
its head, mindful of Chief Justice Burger's admonition in dissent
that legislative practices and decisions can be viewed in a number
of ways; in other words, refusal of various states to enact a
particular law is not itself evidence that the jurisdiction has
determined that such a law offends contemporary standards of
decency.136
The court also explained the limited application of both Coker
and Enmund in examining proportionality, largely by ignoring
them. 37 While both Coker and Enmund proved unfriendly to crimes
that do not involve death, Tison introduced a new wrinkle into the
131. Wilson, 685 So.2d at 1065.
132. Id. at 1073.
133. Id. at 1066. The court noted 14 instances in which the Coker Court's various
opinions referred explicitly to the rape of an adult woman. Id. at 1066 n.2; Coker, 433 U.S. at
592, 593, 595-97, 601 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); id. at
611, 613-15 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
134. Wilson, 685 So.2d at 1067.
135. Id. at 1069.
136. Coker, 433 U.S. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
137. Wilson, 685 So.2d at 1069-70.
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analysis.'- Child rape, the court said, is a major crime, "appalling"
in its nature, and inflicts severe harm - physical, emotional, and
psychological - on the victim.139 For these reasons, the court
concluded, the death penalty is not an excessive penalty for raping
a child under age twelve.140 As for the defendant's attacks upon the
statute's drafting infirmities - permitting the arbitrary and
cap-ricious application of the death penalty - the court noted that,
first, aggravatifig circumstances are provided (although in the
elements of the crime itself);'4 ' and, second, because one cannot
mistakenly rape a child, the class of death eligible defendants is
sufficiently narrow.142 Finally, the court explained that the statute
served the goals of punishment - retribution and deterrence.'"
Three Justices offered brief separate opinions. Justice Kimball's
concurrence stated simply that Coker did not preclude the death
penalty for all rapes and that the state statute sufficiently narrowed
the class of death eligible defendants, per the majority's
explanation. 1 Justice Victory also concurred, but urged the
legislature to amend the state's sentencing statutes to clarify the
procedures for capital child rape.145 Finally, Justice Calogero
dissented, arguing that the statute on its face violated the Eighth
Amendment. 146 Indeed, according to Justice Calogero, it is precisely
because of this facial infirmity that no other state has chosen to
adopt such a statute.
47
On June 2, 1997, the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari in Bethley's case, but not without a comment from three
138. Id. at 1070.
139. Id. See also State v. Brown, 660 So.2d 123, 126 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining the
differences between adolescent teenagers and adolescent children and stating that injury
from child abuse "is inherent in the offense"); State v. Jackson, 658 So.2d 722, 723 (La. Ct.
App. 1995) (explaining that a child's "tender age made her particularly vulnerable and
incapable of resisting... considering [the] acutely deleterious consequences of [the] conduct
on an eight-year-old child").
140. Wilson, 685 So.2d at 1070.
* 141. Id. at 1071.
142. Id. at 1072-73.
143. Id. at 1073. But see, e.g., Fleming, supra note 23, at 749 (arguing that the
Louisiana capital child rape statute "does not serve the principle goals of punishment. The
death penalty does not serve the goal of retribution because inherent in the concept of
retribution is the notion of proportionality, which the statute violates. The punishment does
not serve the principle of deterrence either" because it will decrease reporting of child
rapes).
144. Wilson, 685 So.2d at 1073 (Kimball, J., concurring in the result).
145. Id. at 1073 (Victory, J., concurring with reasons).




Justices. 148 Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer joined, noted that the denial was not a statement about the
merits of the case. 14 9 Rather, because Bethley had been neither
convicted nor sentenced at the time, the case lacked the finality
normally necessary in a death penalty challenke. 15°
Thus, one cannot underestimate Wilson's impact and that of the
Louisiana Legislature's aggressive decisionmaking. First, as
explained further in the next Section, since the passage of the
statute and the Wilson decision, numerous states have enacted or
are contemplating the enactment of laws imposing capital
punishment for child rape and other harsh penalties for sexual
offenses committed against children. 151 Second, the Louisiana
statute and the Wilson decision possibly reflect a renewed societal
judgment that capital punishment is appropriate for a number of
non-homicide offenses that do not directly involve the protection of
children. 152 As yet, despite the growing momentum such laws are
gaining, no jurisdiction has sentenced anyone to death under these
statutes.' In addition, in State v. Gardner, the Utah Supreme
Court, cognizant of Wilson but refusing to follow Wilson's lead,
invalidated a state statute imposing the death penalty for
aggravated assault by a prisoner.154 Nevertheless, just as Coker and
148. Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997).
149. Id. (Stevens, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari).
150. Id.
151. See Higgins, supra note 17, at 30; Barrett, supra note 119, at A21. See generally
Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology, 4 PSYCHOL,
PUB. PoL'Y & L 452 (1998) (providing a detailed account of recently-enacted sex offender
laws and concluding that the features of the "new penology . . . are largely immune from
constitutional limits on judicial review").
152. See Matura, supra note 24, at 255 (stating that "in addition to the use of capital
.punishment for the rape of a minor, strong support also exists across the country for the use
of capital punishment for other crimes where the victim is not killed."); Mello, supra note
23, at 160-61 (considering the various non-homicide capital crimes nationally and concluding
that this legislative trend "might be enough to persuade the Rehnquist/fhomas/Scalia Court
that no national consensus exists for the proposition that death is a 'gros~ly
disproportionate' societal response to the crime of aggravated rape"); Karp, supra note 57, at
1728-29 (considering the viability of capital punishment for armed robbery, kidnapping, and
"life-dangering offenses" after Coker).
153. See Matur, supra note 24, at 256. Jeffrey Matura states that "each year more state
legislatures are taking a serious look at enacting such laws.... [Miany of them are waiting
to see how the Supreme Court rules on the issue." Id.
154. See State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630 (Utah 1997). Justice Durham, writing for the
Gardner majority, cited Wilson but noted that "there were no convictions or sentences" in
that case, "which, like the instant case, involved only a pretrial facial challenge of the
statute's constitutionality." Id. at 650 n.ll. In dissent, Justice Russon chided the majority's
statement about Wilson as "irrelevant." Id. at 654 (Russon, J., dissenting).
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its progeny suggest that constitutional ground for these statutes is
uncertain, 55 Wilson, combined with Tison and subsequent Eighth
Amendment decisions giving greater deference to legislative
enactments, suggests that a previously skeptical Supreme Court
may well find constitutional room for legislation that imposes
capital punishment for non-homicide crimes.
IV. REEVALUATING THE DOCTRINE:
A DEFENSE OF LOUISIANA'S CAPITAL CHILD RAPE STATUTE
To call the Coker decision ambiguous is to be at once repetitive
and obvious. Its ambiguity thus makes it a difficult case to interpret
and apply consistently. The plurality clearly expressed its concern
about imposing capital punishment on those who do not kill, 15 6 but
left open the possibility that some forms of rape could present
circumstances of such brutality that the state could proportionately
impose death as a punishment.'15 Given this ambiguity, and the
ambiguities in capital punishment jurisprudence generally, it is
unsurprising that the Louisiana Legislature took the aggressive step
that it did. Nonetheless, it is equally unremarkable that many have
found Louisiana's capital child rape statute constitutionally infirm
under Coker, given the plurality's strong language concerning
proportionality and the rape-homicide distinction.ss Considering
these conflicts, this Section concludes that the Louisiana statute
155. See Leigh Dingerson, Reclaiming the Gavel: Making Sense Out of the Death
Penalty Debate in State Legislatures, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L & Soc. CHANGE 873, 878 (1991)
(concluding that Coker precludes imposition of the death penalty for crimes in which no
death occurs); Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from Heaven": Mercy in Capital
Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L REV. 989, 1009 n.74 (1996) (stating that courts understand Coker to
preclude the death penalty for non-homicide crimes); Ved P. Nanda, Recent Developments in
the United States and Internationally Regarding Capital Punishment - An Appraisal, 67
ST. JOHN'S L REv. 523, 532 (1993) (stating that Coker requires a killing before a state may
impose the death penalty).
156. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) ("We have an abiding conviction that
the death penalty . . . is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take
human life.").
157. See, e.g., id. at 603 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) ("[I]t may be that the death penalty is not disproportionate punishment for the crime
of aggravated rape. Final resolution of the question must await careful inquiry into the
objective indicators of society's 'evolving standards of decency.'").
158. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 23, at 1372 (concluding that "the Court should
explicitly adopt a standard for capital proportionality review that implicitly runs throughout
Coker: without death in the crime, there will be no death in the punishment."); Lormand,
supra note 23, at 1015 (explaining that "the severity of the crime must be determined, at
least in part, by whether it results in the death of the victim or not."); Fleming, supra note




survives a challenge pursuant to Coker and its progeny for three
reasons: first, it is consistent with recent precedent; second, it
satisfies the objective factors that indicate that society has not set
its face against this particular punishment; and, third, the nature
and psychology of rape indicate the extreme brutality of the act,
helping to satisfy proportionality analysis. Moreover, this analysis
considers the broader consequences for capital punishment
legislation based on these arguments.
A. Precedent and the Louisiana Capital Child Rape Statute
Capital child rape legislation like the Louisiana statute is
consistent with the language of Coker and with recent trends in the
Court's capital punishment cases, most notably with the Tison
decision, which urge greater deference to the political branches in
developing and -effectuating penal law.159 The Coker plurality's
repeated references to the rape of an "adult woman" seemed to
acknowledge that rapes of a minor would present a different case,
decided with a different independent proportionality analysis,
depending upon the circumstances. 160 The Wilson court recognized
this rather unremarkable observation, noting the fourteen instances
throughout the various Coker opinions, including six in Justice
White's plurality opinion, that referred explicitly to the rape of an
adult woman. 61 Because the Coker Court left open the question of
imposing capital- punishment for child rape, we must proceed
beyond Coker to determine whether precedent forecloses capital
child rape legislation.
Those who oppose the constitutionality of the Louisiana statute
argue correctly that Enmund precludes capital punishment for
child rape where the rapist did not attempt or intend to kill the
159. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
does not require federal habeas corpus relief for a death row inmate claiming actual
innocence based on newly discovered evidence); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)
(holding that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the death penalty for a defendant
who commits a capital crime at the age of seventeen); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)
(holding that the Eighth Amendment does not categorically prohibit the execution of amentally retarded defendant); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (holding that the death
penalty is not a disproportionate punishment for one who is a major participant in a felony
and who acts with reckless indifference to human life).
160. See, e.g., Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 ("That question, with respect to the rape of an
adult woman, is now before us.").
161. State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1066 n.2 (La. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Bethley
v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997) (citing various portions of Coker for the proposition that
Coker's holding was limited to the rape of an adult woman).
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victim.162 Tison, however, made room for legislative innovation,
such as capital child rape legislation. While Tison did not overrule
Enmund - indeed, the Court seemed to go out of its way not to
overrule Enmund - it certainly modified Enmund in a significant
way.1' To permit states to impose the death penalty where the
defendant was a major participant in a serious felony and acted
with reckless indifference to human life is to include an entire
class of criminals that Enmund clearly excluded. As Professors
Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker explain, Tison "retracted that
[Enmundl standard," opening the door to several executions of
"non-triggerman" felony murderers. 164 And there is no reason to
believe, based solely on Tison's broad language, that the Court
intended its holding there to apply only to felony murder situations.
The class of perpetrators that fall within Tison's ambit, therefore,
includes child rapists. There can be little doubt that the rape of a
child satisfies the first prong of the Tison standard, as the Court
has itself recognized the seriousness of rape. 65 With the exception
of murder, the Coker plurality noted, rape "is the ultimate violation
of self." 166 As to the second prong, many (though certainly not all)
child rapes involve a reckless indifference to human life; it is these
aggravated rapes that are proper subjects for the death penalty.
167
This standard is met sometimes by the rape itself, in which the
162. See Moeller, supra note 23, at 647 (concluding that "[t]he reasoning in Enmund,
Tison, and Coker supports the conclusion that the death penalty is a disproportionate
penalty for the crime of rape."); Zambrano, supra note 23, at 1287-88 (citing Enmund and
arguing that "[tihough the rape of a child is more heinous than the rape of an adult, it is still
only rape and absent the intention to kill the victim the defendant should not be sentenced
to die."); Lisa White Shirley, Recent Development, State v. Wilson: The Louisiana Supreme
Court Sanctions the Death Penalty for Rape, 72 TuL . REv. 1913, 1922 (1998) (explaining
that, because Enmund forecloses the possibility of capital child rape legislation, the Wilson
court was forced to rely on the Enmund dissent).
163. Compare Enmund v. Florida, 458- U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment would not permit imposition of capital punishment "in the absence of proof that
Enmund killed or attempted to kill"), with Tson, 481 U.S. at 157 (explaining that while
"Enmund held that when 'intent to kill' results in its logical though not inevitable
consequence - the taking of human life - the Eighth Amendment permits the State to
exact the death penalty," this conclusion is consistent with the holding that "reckless
disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry
a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable mental state, a mental state that may be
taken into account in making a capital sentencing judgment.").
164. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 20, at 376.
165. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 597-98 ("We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a
crime. It is highly reprehensible .... Rape is very often accompanied by physical injury to
the female and can also inflict mental and psychological damage.").
166. Id. at 597.
167. See, e.g., LA- REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(D)(2) (West 2000 Supp.).
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 39:1
degree of force and penetration will likely cause severe damage to
the more delicate and underdeveloped body of a child.1 It is met
where the rapist uses a deadly weapon, such as a gun or a knife,
during the course of the rape, such as in Coker.16 9 At bottom, the
rape of a child involves grave (even greater than those attending
adult rape) risks to human life.' 70
Finally, and more broadly speaking, the Court's death penalty
jurisprudence during the Rehnquist Court years has deliberately
evolved in the direction of greater, not lesser, acceptance of the
death penalty, with Thompson serving as the only real bump in the
road.' 7' Tison, Stanford, Penry, and Herrera v. Collins, for
example, indicate the Court's reluctance to interfere with the states'
administration of penal law and its willingness to defer to the
judgments of those political majorities who desire greater use of
capital punishment to address crime.' 72 This jurisprudential trend
suggests that recent precedent encourages, rather than forecloses,
greater legislative experimentation in crafting crime and
punishment regimes.
B. History, Current Practice, and the Louisiana Capital Child
Rape Statute
The Louisiana statute also satisfies the objective criteria for
determining whether a particular punishment is consistent with the
168. See State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1070 (La. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Bethley
v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997) (quoting several Louisiana rape cases that describe the
physical and mental effects of rape on children).
169. Coker, 433 U.S. at 587. This reckless indifference to human life may also exist
where a child rape defendant, as in Wilson, is HIV positive. See Miller, supra note 23, at 202
(stating that the death penalty could be appropriate where the rapist is H1V positive);
Stephanie S. Wepner, The Death Penalty: A Solution to the Problem of Intentional AIDS
Transmission Through Rape, 26 J. MARs.A.L L REv. 941 (1993) (arguing that the death
penalty is an appropriate response where the rapist is HIV positive).
170. See Karp, supra note 57, at 1727-28 (arguing that "it is conceivable that the rape of
children may be distinguished from that of adults on the ground that it is typically more
harmful to the victim and involves a higher degree of moral depravity.").
171. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (overturning the death sentence
of one who had committed murder at the age of fifteen).
172. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
does not require federal habeas corpus relief for a death row inmate claiming actual
innocence based on newly discovered evidence); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)
(holding that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the death penalty for a defendant
who commits a capital crime at the age of seventeen); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)
(holding that the Eighth Amendment does not categorically prohibit the execution of a
mentally retarded defendant); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (holding that the death
penalty is not a disproportionate punishment for one who is a major participant in a felony
and who acts with reckless indifference to human life).
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"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."17 3 Coker, following Gregg's lead, helps make
these factors significant to Eighth Amendment analysis. 74 Although
the plurality ultimately turns to its own independent judgment
about the constitutionality of Georgia's capital rape statute,
1 75 it
indicates the importance of looking to historical and contemporary
civil practices concerning the imposition of the death penalty for
rape.176 This form of analysis has survived intact throughout the
past two decades of capital punishment review and, as Justice
Scalia recognized in Stanford, has become the crucial factor in
determining contemporary standards of decency.177 Indeed, this
analysis is most consistent with the text of the Eighth Amendment,
for courts can hardly determine what society deems "cruel" and
"unusual" without considering civil social traditions, practices and
trends, and its perpetuation (or rejection) of them.178 The key,
however, is to determine whether these are "living traditions,"179 or
whether the body politic, through the practices of legislatures,
prosecutors, and juries, has rejected them as unacceptable or
intolerable.180 In the instant situation, because the revival of capital
rape statutes is a recent phenomenon, it would hardly be useful to
attempt an examination of prosecutorial or jury practices on the
matter, for such data barely exists. That said,. legislation, foremost
among the objective factors, is most relevant.18'
173. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
174. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 593 (stating that "we seek guidance in history and from the
objective evidence of the country's present judgment concerning the acceptability of death as
a penalty for the rape of an adult woman."); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976)
(stating that "the most marked indicator of society's endorsement of the death penalty... is
the legislative response to Furman.").
175. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.
176. Id. at 593.
177. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369.
178. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 873 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that "[o]n its face, the phrase 'cruel and unusual punishment' limits the evolving
standards appropriate for our consideration to those entertained by -the society rather than
those dictated by our personal consciences.").
179. Justice Harlan most poignantly articulated the "living tradition" theory in the
context of individual rights. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (declaring that "tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically
departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is
likely to be sound.").
180. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 378 (explaining that in discerning what is "cruel and
unusual" the Court is determining whether "society has set its face against [a particular
punishment]").
181. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (explaining that "[tihe clearest and
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the
2000
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So, do nationwide legislative practices indicate a national
consensus in opposition to capital punishment when it is applied to
child rapists? If one considers the data in isolation, probably so.182
This highlights one difficulty with the "national consensus"
standard that Stanford adopted: the Coker dissent and the Wilson
majority ably note that there are many ways to interpret legislative,
prosecutorial, and jury practices.t 3 Legislatures, for example, often
gauge their work by looking at the success of similar enactments
by other legislative bodies.lta They also respond differently to court
decisions, particularly those - like Furman and Coker - that
"introduce considerable uncertainty" into the area of crime and
punishment. 8 5 Prosecutors and juries, too, are often driven by
fact-finding and circumstances, making it difficult to discern per se
rules from their decisions in a particular case. Morever, as Justice
Russon argued in his dissent in the Utah Gardner case, "each state
is entitled to address its own problems individually... If the basis
for determining a statute's constitutionality was how many states
had similar statutes, no state could ever enact a novel or distinctive
country's legislatures."); Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 (stating that "statutes passed by society's
elected representatives" are chief among the objective indicia of society's evolving standards
of decency).
182. See, e.g., Moeller, supra note 23, at 643 (considering only those states that have
enacted, or are considering enacting, child rape laws, and concluding that no national
consensus exists favoring capital child rape legislation); Mello, supra note 23, at 160 (stating
that the data regarding the legislatures that currently impose the death penalty for child rape
"is not impressive objective indicia").
183. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584; 614 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Burger explained:
[I1t is myopic to base sweeping constitutional principles on the experience of the past
five years. Considerable uncertainty was introduced into this area of the law by this
Court's Furman decision.... legislatures were left in serious doubt by the expressions
vacillating between discretionary and mandatory death penalties, as to whether this
Court would sustain any statute imposing death as a criminal sanction. Failure of
more states to enact statutes imposing death for rape of an adult woman may thus
reflect hasty legislative compromise occasioned by time pressures following Furman, a
desire to wait on the experience of those states which did enact such statutes, or
simply an accurate forecast of today's holding.
In any case... the plurality's focus on the experience of the immediate past must
be viewed as truly disingenuous.
Id. See also State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1069 (La. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Bethley
v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997) (asserting that "[w]e cannot look solely at what the
legislatures have refrained from doing under conditions of great uncertainty arising from the
Supreme Court's 'less than lucid holdings on the Eighth Amendment.' ") (quoting Coker, 433
U.S. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
184. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
185. Id.
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law without being thwarted by a constitutional challenge."'8 6
Indeed, this is the essence of federalism.187 That said, as the
Supreme Court has explained, such objective factors as legislative
practices are the best indicators of society's moral sanction
regarding a particular punishment.188 Thus, in fairness to federalism
and to society's determinations about what constitutes "cruel" and
"unusual" punishment, it is important to take a broader view of
these historical and contemporary legislative practices, which,
viewed in this way, indeed indicate an emerging national consensus
regarding the imposition of capital punishment for serious
non-homicide crimes (such as child rape) that involve substantial
harm, and risk, to human life, particularly where the victim is a
child.
189
Recall that at common law and early statutory law, rape was
punishable by death.' 9° In reflecting upon the propriety of such
punishments, Blackstone observed that capital punishment was to
be reserved for instances "of the highest necessity," 9' while
punishment generally should be tailored to the "malignity,"
"heinousness, or "enormity" of the crime committed. 92 As Daniel
Boorstin tells us, Blackstone's description of English criminal law
186. State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 654 (Utah 1997) (Russon, J., dissenting).
187. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 524 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(recognizing the value of state experimentation in the area of criminal justice reform); THE
FEDERAUST No. 17, at 120 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that the
state would have primary responsibility for the administration of criminal justice).
188. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
189. See Mello, supra note 23, at 160. Professor Mello explains that while "two out of
thirty-eight jurisdictions [imposing the death penalty for child rape] is not impressive
objective indicia," the scene changes "[i]f the field of vision, however, is expanded to include
statutes authorizing death for all nonhomicide crimes, including rape." Id. Thus,
When viewed in the atmospheric context of Coker's chilling effect on legislative
enactment of such statutes, the numbers, and the trend of their increase, might be
enough to persuade the RehnquistThomas/Scalia Court that no national consensus
exists for the proposition that death is a 'grossly disproportionate' societal response to
the crime of aggravated rape.
Id. at 161.
190. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *210-11.
191. See 1 WILInAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES "133. Blackstone also explains that "every
humane legislator will be... extremely cautious of establishing laws that inflict the penalty
of death, especially for slight offenses, or such as are merely positive." 4 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 1, at *10.
192. Boorstin, supra note 1, at 144. See also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *9 (stating
that "enormity, or dangerous tendency, of the crime that alone can warrant any earthly
legislature in putting him to death that commits it."); id. at *17 (stating that it is "absurd and
impolitic to apply the same punishment to crimes of different malignity"); id. at *196
(describing as "most detestable" the killing of one by poison).
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and of capital punishment fit the complexities of human nature.193
Humanity, reason, and nature thus demanded that rape, like other
sexual crimes "against nature," be punished with death. 194 The
colonies then adopted this common law trend, which continued in
the United States well into the twentieth century. 95 Louisiana's
legislation, then, proves to be less a new innovation than a return
(albeit only a partial one, in light of Coker) to historical
understandings about appropriate punishments for rape.
Moreover, it is a continuing trend and one that has evolved to
include harsher punishments generally for crimes committed
against children. As noted earlier, Mississippi has enacted a statute
similar to Louisiana's, 196 and Georgia has moved in the same
direction. 197  The Montana Senate has considered legislation
providing capital punishment for a second rape conviction where
the perpetrator inflicted serious bodily injury.19 This trend is part
of a larger element of American jurisprudence that has deliberately
evolved to account for the particular harms that one causes when
he or she commits an act of violence against a child. 19 Legislation
that proscribes statutory rape,2°° evidentiary exceptions for child
witnesses,201 and the new breed of recidivist and sex offender
193. Boorstin, supra note 1, at 142 ("Many statements in the Commentaries which
seemed at first to be extolling mercy, were actually only additional ways of saying that
English law, in harmony with natural law, did take account of the minutiae and complexities
of human nature.").
194. Id. at 144.
195. FREIDMAN, supra note 3, at 42.
196. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (Supp. 1997) (providing capital punishment for the
rape of a child under age 14). Recently, Mississippi legislators introduced a bill to lower the
victim's age to 13. H.B. 177, Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1998).
197. Barrett, supra note 119, at A21.
198. Id.
199. See Palmer, supra note 16, at 858-59 (explaining the various ways in which
American law distinguishes children from adults).
200. See Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Toward a New Generation of Statutory
Rape Laws, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L 287, 295 n.31 (1997) (citing and describing the statutory
rape laws of 15 jurisdictions). See also Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450
U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding California's statutory rape law against an Equal Protection Clause
challenge, and asserting that the state has a strong interest in enforcing statutory rape laws
because they help to deter and prevent teenage pregnancy).
201. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). Craig involved the use 6f a Maryland
statutory procedure that enabled a six-year-old sexual abuse victim and three other children
to testify via closed circuit television against a kindergarten owner accused of the abuse. Id.
at 840-43. The Court upheld the statute against a Confrontation Clause challenge, asserting
that "a State's interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims
may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant's right to face
his or her accusers in court." Id. at 853. At the time, 37 states permitted the use of
videotaped testimony, 24 authorized closed circuit television testimony, and eight permitted
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notification laws all help to form a system that recognizes the
particular physical and psychological vulnerabilities of children.20 2
Forty-five states and the United States, for example, have enacted
laws to protect children from sexual predators by requiring
community notification of sex offenders.2°3 In this regard, the
legislatures received a boost not merely from the Wilson court but
also from the United States Supreme Court, which, in Kansas v.
Hendricks,2°4 recently upheld the use of indefinite civil commitment
as a means of punishing dangerous sexual offenders. Although
perhaps the solution upheld in Hendricks represents a more viable
legislative alternative in dealing with the problem of child
the use of a two-way system in which child witnesses see the courtroom and defendant via a
monitor, and where the judge and jury can see the child during the testimony. Id. at 853-54.
202. See Robert E. Freeman-Longo, Reducing Sexual Abuse in America: Legislating
Tougher Laws or Public Education and Prevention, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ.
CONFINEMENT 303, 311-17 (1997). Freeman-Longo details the new forms of sex offender
legislation, much of which is designed to address sexual abuse of children. Id. at 311. These
legislative innovations include "Three Strikes and You're Out" laws, which impose life
sentences on those convicted of three felonies (including sex offenses, such as child rape);
sex offender registration laws, requiring law enforcement and other executive agencies to
"track the whereabouts of sexual offenders"; public notification laws, which require public
notification when a sex offender is released into a particular community ("Megan's Laws");
chemical and surgical castration (approved in California and under consideration in seven
other states); and sexual predator laws, requiring the holding of sexual offenders for
observation and treatment after their criminal sentence has expired. Id. at 311-16.
203. Barrett, supra note 119, at A21. These laws have earned the name "Megan's Laws,"
which refer to Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old New Jersey girl whose murderer had
previously been convicted of several sexual assaults against other children. Id. For a
fascinating discussion of the implications of Megan's law, see Nadine Strossen, Critical
Perspectives on Megan's Law: Protection vs. Privacy, 13 N.Y. L SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 1 (1996)
(providing the statements of panelists during the New York Law School's symposium on
Megan's Law).
The literature on Megan's Law has grown substantially in recent years. See, e.g.,
Freeman-Longo, supra note 202, at 313 (explaining the rise of Megan's Laws in America as
part of a growing national trend toward imposing harsher punishments upon child
offenders); Leonore M.J. Simon, Sex Offender Legislation and the Antitherapeutic Effects on
Victims, 41 ARiz. L REv. 485 (1999) (explaining public attitudes toward sex offenders,
particularly child sex offenders, and the incongruities of modem sex offender legislation);
Brian D. Gallagher, Now That We Know Where They Are, What Do We Do With Them?: The
Placement of Sex Offenders in the Age of Megan's Law, 7 WIDENER J. PuB. L 39, 45-56 (1997)
(describing the current debate over Megan's Law); Robert J. Martin, Pursuing Public
Protection Through Mandatory Community Notification of Convicted Sex Offenders, 6 B.U.
PUB. INT. LJ. 29 (1996) (describing the constitutional and political attacks on Megan's Law).
204. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). Hendricks involved a defendant, defined by state law as
mentally abnormal, who admitted that he was likely to continue sexual assaults against
children if he were released into the community. Id. at 354-55. The Court, in an opinion by
Justice Thomas, held that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act did not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause, as the statute did not establish
criminal proceedings. Id. at 361.
Duquesne Law Review
predators, 25 it also suggests that the Court is poised to afford
greater deference to legislative judgments in this area, even where
that judgment involves use of the death penalty.
The national consensus on imposing death for non-homicide
crimes also is evident in the case of non-sexual crimes that do not
necessarily involve children. Thirteen jurisdictions, as varied as
Florida, Illinois, Montana, and New Mexico, provide capital
punishment for non-homicide crimes such as treason, aggravated
kidnapping, aircraft hijacking, and espionage.2°6 Congress in 1994
approved legislation permitting capital punishment for drug
kingpins who generate more than twenty million dollars per year.
207
Fortunately, from an Eighth Amendment perspective, each of the
proscribed offenses is inherently serious and presents significant
risk to human life.208 Equally important, though, is that these pieces
of legislation weigh heavily in favor of the conclusion that society
has not set its face against the use of the death penalty for child
rape merely because the crime does not necessarily involve the
loss of human life.2°0 Indeed, these legislative trends toward more
severe punishment for sex offenders and those who commit
inherently serious non-homicide crimes -may well suggest that the
body politic is becoming more, not less, moral.
As a caveat, this is not to suggest that the Court analyze capital
questions solely on the basis of historical majoritarian practices
and preferences, for such an analysis would ultimately leave Eighth
Amendment rights at the mercy of the many (thus defeating the
purpose of giving such rights constitutional stature), and give effect
to penal practices that contemporary political communities may
205. Barrett, supra note 119, at A21.
206. See Higgins, supra note 17, at 30. See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-12-42 (Michie 1978)
(providing capital punishment for espionage); FLA STAT. ANN. § 893.13 (West 1997) (providing
capital punishment for drug trafficking); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 578.310 (West 1996) (providing
capital punishment for placing a bomb near a bus terminal); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-220
(1999) (providing capital punishment for aggravated assault or kidnapping while incarcerated
for murder or repeated felonies); 720 ILL Coup. STAT. ANN. 5/30-1 (West 1997) (providing
capital punishment for treason against the state); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-25-55 (1997)
(providing capital punishment for aircraft piracy within state airspace). See also Matura,
supra note 24, at 255-56 (describing the various non-homicide capital statutes); James G.
Wilson, Chaining the Leviathan: The Unconstitutionality of Executing Those Convicted of
Treason, 45 U. Prrr. L REV. 99, 156-57 (1983) (arguing that Coker and Enmund weigh against
the constitutionality of capital treason statutes).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b)(1) (1994).
208. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (finding that the death penalty is
constitutionally appropriate where the defendant is a major participant in a felony and
demonstrates reckless indifference to human life).
209. See Mello, supra note 23, at 161.
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have rejected. Indeed, the Court has firmly rejected a purely
historical analysis. 210 It merely indicates that the Eighth Amendment
itself requires courts to consider civil social practices, traditions,
and attitudes in discerning, but not dictating, the values of the
larger political community.21' By doing so, courts remain
appropriately respectful of legislative efforts to experiment in the
area of crime and punishment and avoid substituting their own
moral and philosophical predilections for those of politicians who
are properly charged with "refm[ing] and enlarg[ing] the public
view."2
12
C. Proportionality Analysis and the Nature and Psychology of
Rape
Perhaps the most disturbing element of the Coker opinion is its
conclusion concerning the severity of rape in comparison to
murder. 13 The plurality explained that "rape by definition does not
include the death of or even serious injury to another person."
21 4
Where death is concerned, the definitional aspect of this assertion
is true. To assert, however, that rape by definition does not include
serious injury to the victim is to proffer a naive definition of the
act.
Others have offered more realistic descriptions. Generally as to
rape, Professor Katherine Baker eloquently, but tragically, explains,
"[r]ape's prevalence forces women to live with a fear of violation
and attack that is essentially unknown to men. This fear cripples
women's ability to move freely and to live life as autonomous
210. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (citing and quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976)) (proclaiming that "this Court has 'not confined the
prohibition embodied in the Eighth Amendment to 'barbarous' methods that were generally
outlawed in the 18th century,' but instead has interpreted the Amendment 'in a flexible and
dynamic manner.' ").
211. Id. at 369-70.
212. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See also
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380 (explaining that " 'proportionality' analysis itself can only be
conducted on the basis of the standards set by our own society; the only alternative, once
again, would be our personal preferences."). But see Matthew E. Albers, Legislative
Deference in Eighth Amendment Capital Sentencing Challenges: The Constitutional
Inadequacy of the Current Judicial Approach, 50 CASE W. Ras. L REv. 467, 490 (1999)
(arguing that deference to the state legislatures in the area of capital punishment "is
unconstitutional because it allots power to states that is specifically reserved for the
courts.").




individuals."2 5 Evelyn Marie Aswad likens rape to torture, stating
that "the suffering of rape survivors is strikingly similar in intensity
and duration to the suffering endured by torture survivors."
216
Specifically as to the Coker analysis, Professor Owen Jones
expresses difficulty with the Court's understanding of the effects of
rape, both from a biological and psychological perspective:
I am not presently convinced that men in the legal system
should be quite so sanguine about their ability to make such
assessments of female psychology in the context of rape. For
everything we know about the biology of behavior suggests
that male and female brains will tend to process and react to
rape differently - and not solely because of the different
ways in which they have been socialized. Consequently, a
behavioral biology perspective on the psychology of rape's
harms may prompt us to reevaluate the bases on which we
compare it to other harms.
21 7
The Coker dissent took sufficient notice of these effects in
tailoring its own proportionality analysis, explaining that "[rjape is
not a mere physical attack - it is destructive of the human
personality."218 Continuing, and conspicuously identifying a more
realistic understanding of the aforementioned biology and
psychology of rape, the dissent stated, "[t]o speak blandly, as the
plurality does, of rape victims as 'unharmed,' or to classify the
human outrage of rape . . . in terms of 'excessive[ly] brutal' versus
215. Katherine K Baker, Once A Rapist? Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in
Rape Law, 110 HARv. L REV. 563, 564 (1997). Professor Baker's work in this area is excellent,
often identifying and evaluating major sources of rape reform, always motivated by a desire
to see that rape becomes much less prevalent and more harshly punished. See id. (stating
that "[cllearly . . . there are powerful reasons for enacting rules that help to decrease the
incidence of rape by securing more rape convictions."). See also Katherine K. Baker, What
Rape Is and What It Ought Not To Be, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 233 (1999) (arguing that, despite
what biologists tell us about rape, "the law must be concerned with trying to make [rape]
not so. The law must try to stop rape.").
216. Evelyn Marie Aswad, Torture By Means of Rape, 84 GEO. UJ. 1913, 1931 (1996).
Although much of Aswad's study treats the infliction of rape by governments for political
purposes, her conclusions, particularly those concerning the physical and psychological harm
of rape, apply to rape generally. In addition to such personal anguish, rape can result in
isolation, both from the community and from intimate relationships. Id. at 1939-42.
217. Jones, supra note 16, at 920. Of course, as Professor Jones notes, "contextualizing
the harm of rape within differently evolved male and female psychologies" carries with it the
risk of further female exclusion from the active life of the community at the hands of those
who view women as especially vulnerable (such as an employer's reluctance to hire women
for particularly risky jobs). Id.
218. Coker, 433 U.S. at 612 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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'moderately brutal,' takes too little account of the profound
suffering the crime imposes upon the victims and their loved
ones."
219
The reality, therefore, is that rape is inherently brutal. Objectively
considered, the law recognizes some rapes as admittedly more so
than others, 220 and it is these aggravated rapes, like those that the
Louisiana statute identifies, 22' that are most deserving of the most
severe punishment. Thus, to draw a bright-line rule in
proportionality analysis that makes the loss of life the standard of
measurement is to ignore the real brutality of rape.222 Indeed, as the
brutality escalates with aggravation, many rapes may involve a
brutality that, under certain circumstances, may well exceed that of
any given murder2 23 To suggest, then, that society's most Severe
moral and penal sanction is necessarily out of proportion to the
harm caused by rape is to vastly underestimate the severe nature
of rape and, ultimately, to undervalue the life and well-being of the
victim.
As American law has recognized in other areas of human
conduct,224 then, and as the Wilson court ably explained, the harms
inflicted by the rapist upon a child are particularly acute and thus
particularly deserving of that most harsh sanction.22 5 Here the
219. Id.
220. See ESmCH, supra note 2, at 4-5 (discussing the distinctions between aggravated
and simple rapes). See also Schafran, supra note 16, at 453 (stating that while most rapes
may not involve physical injuries save for the penetration, "[tihe concept of a 'nonviolent
rape' is a myth.").
221. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:42 (c)(1) (West 1998 Supp.).
222. See, e.g., Wepner, supra note 169, at 941 (stating that "[rnape is unique among acts
of violence [because] it shatters not only a victim's physical well-being but also [destroys]
her emotional world.').
223. Justice Powell presciently recognized this point in his separate opinion in Coker.
See Coker, 433 U.S. at 603 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Powell stated that:
The deliberate viciousness of the rapist may be greater than that of the murderer.
Rape is never an act committed accidentally. Rarely can it be said to be
unpremeditated. There is also wide variation in the effect on the victim .... Some
victims are so grievously injured physically and psychologically that life is beyond
repair
Thus, it may be that the death penalty is not disproportionate punishment for the
crime of aggravated rape.
Id.
224. See supra Section IV.B. text and accompanying notes.
225. See State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063, 1070 (La. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Bethley
v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259 (1997). The Wilson court explains, " 'Common experience tells us
that there is a vast difference in mental and physical maturity of an adolescent teenager...
and a pre-adolescent child .... It is well known that child abuse leaves lasting scars from
generation to the next . . . such injury is inherent in the offense.' " Id. (quoting State v.
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victim, largely because of physical and emotional immaturity, is
"generally incapable of resisting the offender and [is] exceptionally
vulnerable to the effects of rape."ue These effects may well include
physical harms that last throughout life. In addition, the child loses
its innocence, and its dignity.227 One set of commentators on child
sexual abuse explains the lasting psychological torment of sexual
violence against a child by concluding that twenty to forty percent
of victims experience psychiatric problems immediately after their
attack.228 Child sexual abuse victims are "at greater risk for arrest
as juveniles and adults," are more likely than non-victims to run
away from home as adolescents, and are likely to develop a wide
range of psychiatric disorders, including posttraumatic stress
disorder, sleep problems, repressed memory, hypervigilence, and
dissociation.229 More problematically, the study indicates, "[c]hild
victims never learn healthy ways to express their sexuality; as adult
survivors, they may turn to dangerous sexual behaviors, experience
sexual dysfunctions, or avoid sex altogether."230 These effects, then,
combined with the excessive brutality inherent in the act of rape
itself, suggest strongly that child rape is virtually unmatched in
harm to the victim among non-homicide crimes.
The reality of rape thus undermines the Coker plurality's attempt
to minimize the severity of rape by comparing it to murder in
conducting the proportionality analysis. Loss of life per se, thus,
cannot, and should not, serve as the dividing line between crimes
for which the state may impose the death penalty. Rather, in
conducting proportionality analysis of capital child rape legislation,
courts, like the Wilson court, should be appropriately mindful of
the severity of the offense committed and its effect on the victim.
23'
Brown, 660 So.2d 123, 126 (La. Ct. App. 1995). The court continued, "'... the child's tender
age made her particularly vulnerable and incapable of resisting . . . considering [the] acutely
deleterious consequences of [such] conduct on an eight-year-old child.' " Id. (quoting State v.
Jackson, 658 So.2d 722 (La. Ct. App. 1995)).
226. Palmer, supra note 16, at 864.
227. See id. at 878 (stating that "if someone takes the life of another, that life can
never be replaced. Similarly, if someone takes away the innocence of a child, that innocence
can never be replaced. In this respect, the death penalty is not excessive for the crime of
raping a child.").
228. Lurgio et al., supra note 16, at 70.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 70-71.
231. Wilson, 685 So.2d at 1070. See also Palmer, supra note 16, at 863-65 (considering
the impact of rape on the victim in analyzing the question of excessiveness of capital child
rape legislation); Schafran, supra note 16, at 441 (explaining that "[tihe inability to recognize
the damage caused by a 'nonviolent rape' trivializes the seriousness of the crime and
devalues the individual victim. Judges and attorneys must expand their definitions of
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D. A Cautionary Note on Race
This paper focuses upon whether the imposition of capital
punishment for raping a child is cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Asserting that such a
penalty is not cruel and unusual, however, is markedly different
from arguing that the sanction is desirable or that it in all
circumstances satisfies other constitutional provisions, such as the
Due Process Clause or. the Equal Protection Clause. That said,
legislatures enacting, and prosecutors and juries carrying out, death
sentences for child rapists should remain cautious to avoid
application based on the race of the defendant and or the victim.
This is an entirely unremarkable and obvious proposition. It seems
necessary, however, given the historical connection between capital
rape defendants and their racial identity z
2
Coker, for example, involving as it did a white defendant and a
white victim, never mentioned race, nor did it identify a
relationship between racism and capital rape laws. Professor
Randall Kennedy, however, has done so, and his remarks are
particularly compelling.2  He states that historically many convicted
rapists on death row raped white victims.23 As Professor Kennedy
violence to include injury to the victim's psyche.").
232. See generally Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARv. WOMEN'S U.
103 (1983) (providing a comprehensive historical and contemporary account of the
relationship between rape law and race, and arguing that "the legal system's treatment of
rape .both has furthered racism and has denied the reality of women's sexual subordination.
It has disproportionately targeted Black men for punishment and made Black women both
particularly vulnerable and particularly without redress."). See also Adrien Katherine Wing &
Sylke Merchan, Rape, Ethnicity, and Culture: Spirit Injury from Bosnia to Black America,
25 CoLUM. Hum. RTS. L REV. 1, 5 (1993) (stating that "[e]thnicity and culture complicate the
analysis of the crime of rape . . . . Rape committed by someone of the same cultural or
ethnic group may not be regarded in the same manner as if committed by someone from a
different group."). As Professor Wing and Merchan indicate, "[iun America, for instance, the
ultimate punishable rape has been the rape of a White woman by a Black man." Id.
233. KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 324-25.
234. See id. at 312 (stating that "[t]he clearest example of both the presence of racial
discrimination in sentencing and the determination of judges to avoid acknowledging that
presence is the case law that arose from efforts to save from execution black men convicted
of raping white women."). Kennedy details the case of the Martinsville Seven, a group of
black men sentenced to death for the rape of a white woman in Virginia. Id. at 312-17.
Although the case, which involved the use of statistical data, "marked the first instance that
death sentences for rape were seriously challenged on racial discrimination grounds," the
courts consistently upheld the verdict of the all-white jury and the Commonwealth sentenced
the group to death by electrocution. Id. at 316. See also EFJc W. Risa, THE M.aTINSVULE SEVEN
(1995) (providing a comprehensive account of the case); Carol S. Steiker, Remembering
Race, Rape, and Capital Punishment, 83 VA. L REV. 693, 706 (1997) (reviewing Rise's book
and commenting that the Martinsville Seven's "attempt to present statistical proof of
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explains, while black rapists are no longer given the harshest
sentences at substantially greater rates than whites:
It would not be at all surprising to learn, though, that a racial
hierarchy still exists under which, in many locales, the black
offender-white victim case elicits harsher punishment than any
other racial dyad: black offender-black victim, white
offender-white victim, or white offender-black victim ....
The juncture at which sex, race, and violence meet, remains
a place where the rape of a white woman by a black man is
often still considered a more serious affront to decency than
any other species of rape.
231
Coker thus may have answered many (though clearly not all)
questions about the relationship of rape to capital punishment, but,
among the others already identified, it also left open questions
concerning the relationship of race to both.2 To further complicate
matters, McClesky v. Kemp27 set a high, in fact virtually impossible,
standard for Equal Protection challenges based on statistics
demonstrating racial disparities in capital sentencing. McClesky
rejected a challenge to Georgia's capital sentencing regime based
on a comprehensive statistical study that demonstrated that black
defendants were disproportionately likely to receive the death
penalty, particularly where their victims were white.2 The Court
found that the statistics, without more, were insufficient to
conclude that the state had deprived McClesky himself of any
discrimination in capital sentencing represents a 'road not taken' in all three major doctrinal
areas implicated in their case - capital punishment, criminal procedure, and equal
protection."); cf. Wriggins, supra note 232, at 104-05 (stating that "the kind of rape that has
been treated most seriously ... has been the illegal forcible rape of a white woman by a
black man. The selective acknowledgement of Black accused/white victim rape was
especially pronounced during slavery and through the first half of the twentieth century.").
235. KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 325.
236. Steiker, supra note 234, at 708. Professor Steiker states that, by failing to note the
racial disparities that had characterized capital rape laws in the South:
[Tihe [Coker] Court mooted the most troubling evidence that capital punishment was
inevitably racially discriminatory - and did so without a single reference to the issue
of race. With the decision in Coker, the racially charged campaign against the use of
the death penalty for rape ended, not with a bang but a whimper.
Id.
See also Katherine R. Kruse, Race, Angst, and Capital Punishment: The Burger Court's
Existential Struggle, 9 SETON HALL CONST. LJ. 67, 98 (1998) (concluding that in Gregg and
Coker, "the Burger Court missed opportunities to tie its reinstatement of the death penalty to
its concern for fair and nondiscriminatory capital sentencing.").
237. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
238. Id. at 297. See generally DAVID BALDUs ET AL, EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY
(1995) (detailing the statistical evidence that was proffered in the McClesky litigation).
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constitutional rights.239 Still, despite the obstacles that it has placed
in the path of those -who wish to challenge the application of the
death penalty on racial discrimination grounds, McClesky did not
eliminate questions about the role of race in death penalty
legislation and administration, particularly where the crime is rape.
Although Professor Michael Mello has done so,240 none of this is
to suggest that legislators should avoid enacting capital rape
legislation merely because of the racial concerns that the history of
capital rape laws raises. Indeed, because capital sentencing for rape
dissipated after Furman, Gregg, and Coker, little hard evidence
exists for the proposition that black defendants will necessarily
receive death sentences either because of their race or the race of
their victim. Moreover, structural safeguards against racial bias now
exist in capital sentencing, and in the criminal justice process
generally, that did not exist before Coker.241 Let us hope that we
have at least come this far, as we have in so many other areas of
political life.242 But history urges sagacity and caution. Thus,
legislators, prosecutors, and jurors should be wary of these
concerns, carefully tailoring, enforcing, and administering capital
child rape legislation to ensure that the role of race is mitigated, if
not eliminated.
V. CONCLUSION
Publius reminds us that human nature is, and, thus, that human
239. McClesky, 481 U.S. at 297.
240. See Mello, supra note 23, at 198. Professor Mello writes:
I have suggested that, under prevailing proportionality law as interpreted by the
current personnel of the United States Supreme Court, capital punishment for rape
will likely be held to pass constitutional muster. I have also argued that the racist
history of capital punishment for rape should invalidate it as applied, even under the
base standards of Justice Powell's scabrous opinion in McClesky.
Id.
241. See, e.g., TIrner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986) (holding that "a capital
defendant accused of an interracial crime [is] entitled to have prospective jurors informed of
the race of the victim and questioned [on voir dire] on the issue of racial bias."); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to strike jurors solely on the basis of their
race); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (holding that the Eighth Amendment requires
individualized sentencing to ensure that juries have complete and reliable information when
weighing sentencing decisions).
242. Our modest political improvements in race relations have often come, ironically,
after the prompting of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954) (holding that segregated schools violated the Equal Protection Clause); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that state anti-miscegenation laws violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
Duquesne Law Review
communities are, complex. The legislator in these complicated,
socially-constructed, and often tragic political communities is,
therefore, charged with the unenviable task of crafting legislation
that will at once enable the government to control the governed, as
well as itself.243 Nowhere is this task more complicated than in the
area of crime and punishment, where lawmakers are forced to
address serious wrongs committed against individuals, and against
the community itself, without irrationally acquiescing in a spirit of
vengeance or hatred that often accompanies public opinion on
questions of penal law. Capital child rape legislation such as
Louisiana's implicates these most difficult conflicts, pitting the need
and public desire for society's most severe penal sanction against
the limitations on majoritarian conduct that the Eighth Amendment
imposes. Precedent, our nation's living and evolving traditions, and
the nature and psychology of child rape strongly suggest that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not prohibit capital
child rape legislation. By the same token, the survival of legislation
such as Louisiana's suggests that the state may constitutionally
punish a number of other non-homicide offenses with the death
penalty, where those offenses, like child rape, are inherently
serious and involve substantial risks of harm or death. Giving
appropriate deference to the evolving standards of decency that
these laws reflect, then, satisfies not only the court's role pursuant
to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause but also the Framers'
vision of a constitutional republic in which the people's
representatives enjoy ultimate authority to administer justice by
enlarging and refining the public's view of penal law.
243. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
James Madison explained that:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither 4xternal nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next
place, oblige it to control itself.
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